Learning To Use Soft Power According to these reports, the department eventually relented in its struggle with the DoD because it was unsure of its ability to effectively manage the programs. The department's desire to control these programs and its conflicting apprehension about their management highlights the dilemma of other soft power initiatives. Not surprisingly, citing the "militarization of diplomacy," our diplomatic elites continue to argue for substantial increases in foreign assistance initiatives and thousands of new personnel for the State Department. But few acknowledge the organizational and cultural challenges that leave the State Department incapable of effectively managing current initiatives or leading interagency operations. Before the U.S. moves foreign assistance programs from the DoD, the State Department should con-sider a deep organizational introspective of its management and culture. Soft power generally refers to assisting democratic practices through public diplomacy, humanitarian aid, cultural programs, education, and economic and security assistance. In real terms, it means shifting DoD resources and funding huge increases in programs and staffing at the State Department. A recent study by the American Academy of Diplomacy called for half a billion dollars annually in new public diplomacy programs and the transfer of $785 million in annual security assistance programs to the State Department. Other advocates urge staff expansion, with some even calling for nearly tripling the department's staff from 11,500 to 30,000. Despite assertions that more money and staffing will cure the United States' foreign relations ills, Foggy Bottom is neither organizationally astute nor culturally adept enough to manage a large influx of resources or lead interagency initiatives. It is doubtful that even the most ardent advocates of soft power would say the State Department is prepared to accept even the existing 26 percent of the foreign assistance budget that the DoD inherited and executes, much less billions more for new programs. The State Department is an oddly structured organization with 48 functional and regional divisions. Six undersecretaries manage anywhere from one to seven bureaus, ranging in size from a few dozen people to a few hundred. No less than 11 other major divisions report directly to the secretary of state. The organization reflects less that of an operating unit or business organization and more of a huge administrative staff to support the daily diplomatic needs of the secretary. Further complicating matters, the department is awash with elite senior leaders with confusing levels of status and responsibilities. More than 42 assistant secretaries and dozens of deputy assistant secretaries vie with special envoys, former ambassadors, counselors and 17 other senior officials for opportunities to influence organizational decisions. Further, an entrenched duality exists between the department staff and overseas posts. The United States maintains some 180 overseas missions, each led by a chief of mission who reports, in theory, directly to the president. These chiefs proffer advice and guidance on foreign policy more from personal perspectives than from a coherent regional bureau policy. At times, overseas posts are at odds with departmental guidance; occasionally, they are in outright conflict with established policy. The other issue is a bureaucratic culture that slows day-to-day business and retards the accomplishment of strategic objectives. The Foggy Bottom culture embraces consensus more than timely or practical decision-making. While that approach may be of strategic value in diplomacy, it is much less valuable in executing the science of economic development programs and nation-building. Soft power requires the finesse of diplomacy, but also the hard and practical demands of training police and judges or ensuring the distribution of humanitarian aid. The foreign policy elite continues to disparagingly compare the number of Foreign Service professionals with the number of military band members, when it should be making comparisons with other military attributes such as practical decision-making, strategic planning and objective management. The State Department is neither organizationally ready nor culturally capable of handling the vast responsibilities of soft power. Handing it carte blanche funding would squander resources and potentially retard the progress made by the military in foreign assistance. Before we rush to "demilitarize diplomacy" and allocate billions for soft power, it's only prudent we examine the distinct organizational challenges and cultural shortcomings that reign at Foggy Bottom. By U.S. Air Force Col. Stuart Archer, a former military detailee to the U.S. State Department. These views are his own and do not reflect the policies of the Air Force, the Defense Department or the State Department.
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