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Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence
Lessons Learned and Best Practices

Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners
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Summary

Over the past several years, it has become clear that success in certain types of modern combat operations and their aftermath—Afghanistan and Iraq are prime examples—requires the integration of different instruments of U.S. power and influence, both military and civilian, to a far greater degree than in previous major conflicts.1 This need for an integrated approach was foreshadowed by the U.S. experience in Bosnia and Kosovo, not only in halting the fighting but also in keeping it from reemerging. Experience in these four conflicts, as well as in combating international terrorism, provides fertile ground for a systematic analysis of what works and what does not; an analysis that highlights necessary changes in the way the United States undertakes military interventions and deals with the political-military and societal consequences of such interventions. The same applies to key international security institutions, notably NATO.

It is striking that lessons learned and best practices in this area have emanated mostly from the field rather than at the national command level in Washington (or at NATO–Brussels). More often than not, lessons with the greatest utility for the future have emerged from what individual commands, missions, units, and individuals have done in practice in order to complete their assignments and achieve their broader goals. This has led to innovation and cooperation across institutional, bureaucratic, and cultural boundaries, both military and civilian, and between U.S. government entities, international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It has also led to a basic insight: Where these cooperative and integrated efforts work, they become an important security multiplier, helping to achieve results that none of the instruments of power and influence could achieve on their own. As will become clear in this report, the integration of instruments of power and influence can help the United States and its friends and allies deal with the range of emerging threats and challenges that can be collectively referred to as asymmetrical warfare.

This report is the product of more than two years of research and dialogue among experienced practitioners working to document and analyze lessons learned and best practices, especially from Iraq and Afghanistan but also informed by Bosnia and Kosovo. It is directed in the first instance toward military intervention and its aftermath in operations at the relatively low end of the military-kinetic spectrum, such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. But it

1 Earlier instructive instances of the relationship between conflict and postconflict situations and U.S. military-civilian interaction include post–World War II Germany and Japan, post–U.S. Civil War Reconstruction, and the so-called Philippine Insurrection of 1899–1902. The two European examples, however, involved modern industrial societies, large-scale occupation by a U.S. citizen-army able to impart nonmilitary “lessons,” and homogeneous populations essentially cooperative, to their own collective benefit, with the “occupiers.” Reconstruction in the American South contains many lessons of what not to do, while the Philippine example is the closest parallel to post–May 2003 Iraq.
is also directed at all phases of combat, as well as efforts to forestall conflict and, where it does take place, to deal with the postconflict period, including what is now often called nation-building. As becomes clear in this report, key lessons also apply across the board for the future of U.S. foreign policy and national security.

The report summarizes the results of conferences and meetings of a panel of senior practitioners convened jointly by the RAND Corporation and the American Academy of Diplomacy that brought together nearly 70 individuals with extensive civilian and military experience, including at senior levels of government in the United States, Canada, and Europe; at international institutions; at NGOs; and in the private sector. The project’s terms of reference are presented in the Introduction. Our most salient findings are summarized in Chapter Five as 18 Basic Principles for Success. A list of the members of the panel of senior practitioners follows this Summary, and brief biographical notes on the panel are provided in Appendix C.

**Strategic Framework Issues**

Six observations set the framework for our recommendations:

1. **Process Versus Policy and Product**
Most of the discussion and recommendations that follow are about process rather than policy or product. In particular, to be effective, the integration of instruments of power and influence needs to be as flexible as possible, especially at the theater and field levels.

2. **The National Security Act**
Unless the administration that takes office in January 2009 and Congress are unwilling or unable to adopt this report’s most important recommendations, we do not call here for a root-and-branch reorganization of the U.S. government or amending the National Security Act. We believe the act is sufficiently flexible to allow for the implementation of our recommendations: the key issues are leadership, from the President on down, and the way in which the National Security Council (NSC) system is organized and used.

3. **Money Matters**
Funding is critical, as are other resources in sufficient amounts. This includes ensuring that the right institutions and individuals get the money they need when they need it; that money and other resources are moved flexibly from task to task; and as many decisions as possible are allowed to be taken on the spot by the people doing the practical work.

4. **Congress Matters**
Congress appropriates the money and sets parameters and limitations on how it is spent. Thus it must be treated as a full member of the team, from start to finish. To do its part effectively, Congress needs to update outmoded processes and procedures for dealing with U.S. foreign and security policy in the modern age.
5. The Importance of the Host Government
Interventions rarely succeed without a sound and potentially successful partner on the ground: It is their country, not ours. Acting in concert with the local government and helping it to build capacity are almost always preconditions for long-term success.

6. Some Modesty is in Order
Recent U.S. military engagements abroad show that there are limits to the uses of various levers of power and influence. Outsiders can only accomplish so much. Their capacity to transform societies is limited. Political change is almost always a lengthy process, social change even more so, and cultural change (if it can be done at all) a matter of decades, if not centuries.

Key Recommendations: United States

Defining the Tasks: Planning

Planning First. The most important factor in determining whether a military or military-political-economic operation succeeds is prior planning. This must be undertaken at every level of activity and from the outset involve every actor with a potential role in an operation: This is the concept of obtaining “buy in.” It must include host governments, as well as non-U.S. organizations that could become involved in any phase of an operation.

Effective planning can help rectify gaps in funding and numbers of competent personnel, especially in the civilian agencies. Otherwise, the U.S. military often ends up having to undertake tasks (e.g., nation-building) for which others are better qualified and that divert it from military tasks. Timely planning can lead to greater effectiveness early in an intervention (perhaps before an insurgency or other opposition has a chance to develop), when opportunities to influence events tend to be greatest and when the architecture of postconflict efforts is best put in place.

Resources and Authority. With the assignment of missions and responsibilities must also come money, other resources, and a share in authority. This means involving the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and congressional leadership from the beginning.

National Security Council Leadership. To provide proper oversight and political direction, the overall U.S. planning function should be lodged at the NSC level, operating in tandem with OMB, and planning in different agencies should be overseen by the NSC. This should include a standing, White House–level planning process dealing with generic requirements; the identification of relationships among tasks and agencies likely always to be present; and the gaming of different scenarios and their planning and resource requirements.

Engaging the U.S. Government Broadly

Who Is There, Who Is Not There. Experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has sent a powerful message about the need for more parts of U.S. government to be involved in foreign interventions in order to maximize the effectiveness of the U.S. power and influence projected into conflict situations. The U.S. military has usually taken the lead. The U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) often have been less involved than needed to ensure maximum effect, in major part because of lack of resources. Other elements of the U.S. government have been largely absent. For example, only a handful of per-
sonnel from the U.S. Department of Agriculture are deployed in Afghanistan. In many cases, USAID will be best placed to undertake and integrate activities that fall under the rubric of development—provided that it is sufficiently funded and staffed. Where USAID falls short, expertise should be drawn from the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, and Education; the Drug Enforcement Administration; and the National Institutes of Health. However, all of these agencies have other missions, budgets, and domestic political constituencies that inhibit foreign deployment and make them reluctant to take part in such operations. There needs to be an expeditionary capacity in these critical civilian areas to enable overall mission success; this will only happen if required by the President and Congress.

Local Police. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, training local police forces is a critical requirement. Finding and encouraging U.S. police trainers to deploy abroad has proved daunting, in part because few U.S. police forces either have officers to spare or the inclination to take part in foreign interventions. International cooperation is thus crucial to success in this area—e.g., Italy’s carabinieri and France’s gendarmerie.

Recommendations. At heart, there must be political will to make the necessary changes and to foster the interagency cooperation that is so essential. That means political leadership at the top of the U.S. government—clear presidential direction and congressional support—along with adequate funding.

Specifically:

Enlarge the Department of State and USAID. The Department of State currently has about 6,600 officers. The panel of senior practitioners welcomes the Bush administration’s recommendation in the FY09 budget to increase this number by 1,100 officers, and Congress should fully fund it. Priority should be given to further increases in Department of State personnel (both in the Foreign Service and the Civil Service, as well as at USAID) over the next five years, building on lessons learned and as practice determines need and usefulness. This increase is also needed to develop, train, and retain significant numbers of officers with specialized skills that will not be needed at all times but which need always to be on call.

Education. Education in national security affairs needs to reflect the new demands of civil-military cooperation. The National Defense University (Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.) should include a new multi-agency National Security College. Resources should be made available for Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and their counterparts in other agencies with national security responsibilities to have significant mid-career educational opportunities. The Foreign Service Institute should increase the number of students from the Department of Defense (DoD) and other agencies. Career-tracking adjustments will be needed to ensure that this added education provides added benefits in future assignments and promotions.

Support Bush Administration Initiatives. President Bush’s proposal for National Security Professional Development (Executive Order 13434) should be fully funded and implemented, along with his 2007 State of the Union Address proposal for a volunteer Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). The CRC should recruit, train, exercise, and retain a wide variety of skills associated with combat Phase 4 (nation-building) and have the capacity to deploy lead elements rapidly after the initial introduction of military forces.

A Civilian Goldwater-Nichols? Should the next administration prove unwilling or unable through executive actions to make the changes outlined here, Congress should legislate the necessary additional incentives and requirements for serving civilian officers in various U.S. government departments and agencies, along the lines of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which applies only to the military. Even without such
legislation, different civilian elements of the U.S. government should provide tangible incentives and rewards to officers who take part in cross-agency and cross-discipline service and who are prepared to be part of a deployable expeditionary capacity in civilian activity. Promotion boards should be tasked to take into account such career-enhancing service and to ensure that such service is not career retarding.

**Congress Must Also Act.** Responsibility for authorizing, appropriating, and overseeing executive branch agencies is in both houses of Congress divided among a variety of different committees and subcommittees. A basic overhaul of these procedures is unrealistic. We propose the creation of two new select committees, one in each house, devoted to reviewing the overall integration of instruments of power and influence and reporting findings in terms of possible programs and appropriations. We also propose that the Congressional Research Service (CRS) prepare its own annual report on this subject and that the Government Accountability Office be tasked to do likewise. We propose joint committee hearings on overall national security issues, requirements, and budgets.

**A National Security Budget.** In like fashion, the administration’s annual budget submissions each January should include analysis of the relationships of different programs to one another in a separate volume on the national security budget that includes foreign assistance, diplomacy, defense, homeland security, and intelligence.

**Shift Budget Priorities—Military to Nonmilitary.** The administration should analyze overall national security requirements and compare them with the distribution of resources among departments and agencies. The current ratio of funding as between OMB’s 050 account (defense) and the 150 account (Department of State, all foreign aid, and international institutions) is about 17:1. *This is a dysfunctional skewing of resources-to-tasks that is far beyond legitimate disparities deriving from the higher costs of military instruments.* DoD is authorized to transfer up to $200 million to the Department of State for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance programs in foreign countries. These funds should be increased substantially. Even better would be direct budgeting to the Department of State and USAID and a consequent long-term strengthening of their capacity to perform such work. Funding should thus be increased for the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and for USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Office of Transition Initiatives.

**Recreate a USIA-Like Capacity.** In 1999, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was folded into the Department of State. In our judgment, that amalgamation has been less than successful, especially in keeping a high priority on a quasi-independent presentation of “the best of America” as opposed to being a captive arm of U.S. foreign policy. Something “USIA like” is also needed for interaction with the military in operations, both well in advance of operations in particular countries and in postconflict situations. The simplest step would be simply to recreate USIA, by congressional mandate if it cannot be accomplished through administrative action.

**The Interagency Process in the Theater and the Field**

In many respects, interagency efforts at the theater or field level are even more important than at higher levels of government. Interaction between military and nonmilitary activities needs to be seamless. As requirements for assistance with governance (including human rights), reconstruction, stabilization, and development increase, the requirement also increases for cooperation across institutional boundaries.
One Team. The in-theater U.S. country team needs to be all-inclusive (including specialized agencies and organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Operations Command), be able to share information and intelligence, have common communications protocols and systems, and put a premium on building and sustaining mutual confidence and respect.

End Stovepiping. To the extent possible, stovepiping of different agencies must be eliminated, such as the current practice of requiring field-level missions to refer to higher levels in-theater or to Washington for permission to take actions that either need to be decided upon rapidly or where local expertise should trump that at the parent level.

Effective Lines of Authority. There need to be clear lines of authority in the theater and field. Where possible (i.e., where military requirements are not overriding), the local U.S. ambassador should be the senior officer in the interagency country team. In any event, the practical working relationship between the U.S. ambassador and the local U.S. military commander is critical for success. Setting parameters and business rules can help build mutual trust.

Political Advisors. The Department of State provides political advisors (POLADs) to U.S. military commands who work directly for the commander, not the department. They provide the independent advice of a seasoned FSO to the commander; a conduit for policy and position on a semi-official basis; and feedback to the Department of State on military perspectives. POLADs should also be assigned to subordinate commands. They should be formed into a POLADs Corps to foster a sense of shared experience. Likewise, key U.S. military commands should assign liaison officers to appropriate bureaus of the Department of State. USAID and the U.S. military can be linked through the creation of Development Advisors, as well as Senior Development Advisor positions, for each combatant command.

Needs and Opportunities in the Theater and in the Field

Field-Level Collaboration. In a combat zone, there needs to be the closest collaboration regarding the conduct of military operations, the provision of security for noncombat (and especially civilian) activities, the role that civilian activities play in both facilitating military success and the success of the overall mission, and the way in which all tasks are melded.

It’s Their Country! Setting objectives, planning operations, coordinating activities, and assigning authority and responsibilities must be done with the full involvement of the host country. In approaching nation-(re)building, it is critical to ensure that there is buy-in from the host nation’s leadership and a basis for the support of the host nation’s people.

Making it Work with the Host Government. To be effective, coordination among outside actors and with local agencies must be comprehensive. In Afghanistan, this has been undertaken by the Policy Action Group (see Appendix A). Such a structure is needed for any multinational counterinsurgency operation to draw together efforts by the host nation and outsiders. Similar organizations are needed on a regional basis—e.g., a Joint Afghan-Pakistan Action Group.

Talking the (Local) Talk. A premium must be put on recruiting as many U.S. personnel as possible for service in the field who can communicate in the local language(s). All personnel, civilian and military, who may interact with the local population need to be given cultural and historical awareness training before deployment. It is also clear that foreign language training in U.S. schools and colleges needs to be given far greater emphasis than at present. This critical liability to the evolving U.S. role in the world needs to be corrected.
Training (and More Training). This includes both the training of units and individuals in their separate military and nonmilitary organizations and training them together. It needs to include training military units and personnel likely to be engaged with a local population in a wide range of civilian skills.

The Person on the Spot Usually Knows Best. Local commanders (military and civilian) are usually best able to assess local needs and opportunities, as well as practical issues regarding military and nonmilitary activities. Emphasis on tactical flexibility and on devolving authority and responsibility to low levels should apply both to military operations and nonmilitary activities and personnel.

Flexible Funding Authority. This flexibility must extend to the allocation of resources, including across agencies operating in the field. For many U.S. government agencies in Washington, this will require a major bureaucratic leap in the dark, and Congress must be willing to cede some of its fiscal authority. Ideally, in any given intervention, there should be a country-team financial account of significant size that is administered jointly by the local U.S. ambassador and the combatant commander.

Helping USAID Do Its Job. To be effective in the field, USAID must have more capacity to manage its funds. Its current contracting procedures inhibit its effectiveness and need to be redesigned for wartime. USAID’s funding mechanism for foreign interventions needs to be structured along the same lines as its disaster assistance capacity, which allows for quick responses by the U.S. government to foreign natural disasters.

They Build a Road; We Gain an Ally. In Afghanistan, infrastructure projects (especially road building) have proved to be highly productive investments, positively affecting the local economy and governance and winning hearts and minds. More funds need to be made available and more authority given to officials on the spot. Institutions like the World Bank may sometimes be better able to undertake this work but often lack the funding and flexibility to respond quickly.

Conservation of Experience. Military units and nonmilitary personnel often develop skills and modes of operation not provided for in the rule book or easily taught in predeployment briefings. They develop critical relationships with national and local government officials, tribal/clan leaders, and the local population that cannot be easily passed on from one unit/individual to another. A high premium should thus be put on lessons learned and best practices, which need to be assiduously developed, validated, and passed on, both in the indoctrination of incoming personnel and in U.S.-based training and national security education.

Extended Tours of Duty—Military and Civilian. Likewise, there is value in extending the tours of duty of some military and nonmilitary personnel, especially where units and individuals engage with local leaders and civilian populations, as in nation-building. However, units and individuals, especially those involved in combat tasks, must at some point be rotated. This argues for the creation of cadres of individuals who will accept longer tours to provide continuity and who will educate follow-on leadership on engagement with local contacts. Specialists recruited for this purpose should be given added incentives for long service in theater.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are in wide use in Iraq and in 26 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces as part of the NATO-led effort there (see Appendix B). Typically, a U.S.-led PRT consists of a joint civil-military leadership group representing the Department of State, USAID, and DoD, supported by a core unit of military security personnel that provides for the defense
of the PRT itself and, in a more limited capacity, helps provide some protection for local populations. Opinions about PRTs are strongly divided between the governmental—especially the military—and nongovernmental camps. In any event, the following should apply:

**Tailor to Needs and Conditions.** With PRTs, there can be no one-size-fits-all structure. Judgments about the best combination of tasks, skills to be deployed, balance to be struck between military and nonmilitary personnel, and size and resources can only be made on the ground, often as the result of trial and error.

**Not a Band-Aid.** PRTs are not a substitute for more-robust efforts by aid agencies, to compensate for a lack of military personnel, or as half measures for more-encompassing reforms that need to be undertaken by central, regional, or local governments.

**Minimum Size.** In general, regarding PRTs, bigger is better. In some cases, the more robust Vietnam-era model of Civil Operations Rural Development Support (CORDS) will more likely prove successful.

**Doctrine.** DoD, the Department of State, and USAID need jointly to develop clear and precise doctrine about PRT missions, structure, operations, and activities. Ideas should be elicited from the UN, NATO, NGOs, international organizations, and the Iraqi and Afghan governments.

**Pass on the Knowledge.** Much work has already been done in both Iraq and Afghanistan to develop PRT lessons learned and best practices. A training school of excellence should be created for both U.S. and non-U.S. personnel—e.g., the NATO School at Oberammergau, Germany.

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**Nongovernmental Organizations**

Many NGOs, especially those engaged in humanitarian or development work, can be of significant value to U.S. objectives in country even if they act independently. They vary on the issue of neutrality and how closely they can be seen to associate with the military and civilian government agencies. These differences need to be respected. Complete integration of their efforts with those of military and civilian government officials will rarely be possible, but will fall somewhere on the spectrum of coalescence, collaboration, cooperation, or information sharing. In some circumstances, objectives will be better served through an expeditionary civilian capacity deployed with the military.

**Get to Know the NGOs.** U.S. and international institutions should identify in advance relevant NGOs, including what they can do, where they are prepared to operate, and conditions of relations with U.S. military and civilian agencies, the UN, the EU, and NATO. Long-term relations can be pursued with appropriate NGOs to build mutual trust and confidence. Relevant U.S. government agencies should have liaison officers in contact with NGOs, and selected NGOs should be invited to join the planning process, at least to ensure the sharing of information.

**NGOs in Theater-Level Planning.** At the in-theater level, NGOs should be invited to take part in day-to-day information sharing and to join PRTs. Some may present problems, however, especially if they operate in insecure areas, act in ways offensive to the host government or population, or need to be rescued from hostile situations.

**Private Contractors**

In conflict zones, the use of private contractors for many duties related to U.S. military deployments has increased dramatically in recent years. They have proved their worth in undertaking
some tasks the performance of which by uniformed personnel would detract from the latter’s skills and training—e.g., catering and logistical transport in noncombat areas. Private contractors can also be of value in construction, training local personnel, and helping restart economies disrupted by war or political breakdown.

**Planning.** The potential roles and missions of private contractors should be taken into account in U.S. government planning, and representatives of this sector should be called upon for advice and counsel. The United States should create a single set of rules, regulations, and standards for contracts with nongovernmental entities and individuals that is uniform across U.S. government agencies.

**Armed Personnel.** In theater, the activities of contract U.S. private-sector local military, paramilitary, and police trainers should be rigorously supervised by U.S. military or civilian officials. Any security personnel carrying weapons should be part of the U.S. military establishment or the Department of State Departmental Security, with appropriate legislative mandate, jurisdiction, and investigative and judicial instruments. These necessary steps will impose significant new personnel and funding requirements on DoD and the Department of State.

### Key Recommendations: International Cooperation

U.S. activities, both civilian and military, can often be multiplied by the engagement of non-U.S. agents and assets. In some cases, other countries have useful nonmilitary instruments that the U.S. lacks. Even where this is not true, engaging non-U.S. assets can spread material and human costs, thus helping to sustain U.S. popular and congressional support for operations. However, there will often be a necessary trade-off: the need to share decision and influence in addition to risk and responsibility. *The panel of senior practitioners believes that, in the situations explored here, the United States should generally accept some limits on independence of decision and action to gain tangible and political support from other nations.*

**Transatlantic Strategic Engagement**

In any event, there is great value in regular, senior-level engagement of key partner states, especially across the Atlantic, about overall strategic issues, including potential crises or conflicts and the ramifications of the use of force, and other instruments that may be brought to bear on the situation. Ideally, this should be done within NATO. It also needs to be done through a new strategic partnership between the United States and the EU, recognizing the immense nonmilitary capabilities of nations on both sides of the Atlantic, especially in health, education, development, nation-building, and governance.

**Rules of the Road**

Lines of authority need to be as clear as when the United States acts alone. Effective coordination of multinational action requires all nations taking part to delegate substantial authority to their local representatives—a step that is especially difficult for EU and NATO nations. There also need to be functional arrangements for combining military and civilian activities. The United States may be the largest and most influential player, but the U.S. country team can only be one player among many in setting directions, making and executing plans, and fostering coherence and cooperation. European allies must recognize that their influence
will depend to a large degree on their willingness to contribute resources and to allow those resources to be used flexibly.

**Coordinating the Nonmilitary Effort**
Coordination of nonmilitary activities benefits from having a single individual of ministerial rank—e.g., from the UN or EU—able to speak for major outside entities (especially to coordinate external development assistance) and to work effectively with the host government. In Afghanistan, this is proving to be indispensable.

**Information, Intelligence, and C4ISR**
For effective conduct of multinational operations, information and intelligence need to be shared across institutions to the degree possible. Many countries resist sharing intelligence. The critical way around this problem is mutual trust, developed through experience. Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) issues are closely related and also have to be sorted out if operations are to succeed.

**Interoperability, Technological Transfer, and the Defense Trade**
In order for the U.S. military to be able to work effectively with the militaries of other nations and institutions (including the UN, the EU, and other members of NATO), more work needs to be done to overcome impediments in three critical areas: the compatibility of equipment among the military forces of different actors, the sharing of high technology (where appropriate), and the ability of countries to preserve their defense industrial bases (in part through freer defense trade), which helps to create domestic political support for defense efforts. The United States, including Congress, needs to assume a lead role in these areas, but European allies and the EU must also play necessary roles.

**United Nations**
The UN is the largest provider of military forces in intervention operations after the United States, with nearly 100,000 soldiers and police deployed in some 20 operations. It is also a major provider of nonmilitary activity, especially in the areas of development, human rights, and refugee assistance. For most countries, the UN is the critical political validator of military action, especially in the form of resolutions of the UN Security Council, preferably under Chapter VII (enforcement) of the UN Charter. Most countries, to include U.S. allies in Europe, find it difficult to engage in military actions that do not directly affect the security of the homeland without a UN mandate. NATO’s military actions regarding Kosovo in 1999, undertaken without a UN Security Council mandate, were a short-lived exception: NATO member states supported the intervention, but any UN Security Council mandate would have been vetoed by the Russians and perhaps also the Chinese. A UN mandate was secured for the subsequent NATO-led Kosovo Force. The UN is also the principal provider of international police around the world, a form of security providing that, while often indispensable, is usually in short supply. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO looked to the UN to provide the police elements of the international mission. The UN helps to conduct, supervise, and validate elections. And it has long played a critical role both in political transitions and in transitions from open conflict to peacekeeping operations. Indeed, despite the derogatory comments made about the UN by U.S. detractors, its work relieves the United States of major burdens in many parts of the world. Further, because of its long experience, the UN’s perspective should almost always be
called upon and, unless there are reasons to the contrary, heeded, at least as a guidepost to what is possible, what can most usefully be done, and what errors are to be avoided.

Thus, the UN should be involved in planning, UN representatives should be part of international coordinating mechanisms in the field, and there should be permanent, senior-level liaison between the UN and both NATO and the EU. Stabilization, reconstruction, and nation-building capacity should be built into the UN through the creation of a Technical Agency for Stabilization and Reconstruction.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO and its member nations have gained a wealth of experience from postconflict deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as from current operations in Afghanistan, where NATO has commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since August 2003. NATO also has done some military training in Iraq and has had relevant experience elsewhere, including earthquake disaster relief in Pakistan.

Caveats and Other Problems. In Afghanistan, NATO and the ISAF mission have been handicapped by the so-called caveats imposed by some NATO member states that limit where their forces can be deployed and the tasks they can undertake. Caveats reduce local commanders’ tactical flexibility, decrease NATO’s military effectiveness, and create serious political strains within the Alliance. Yet without imposing caveats, some NATO countries would not politically be able to be engaged at all. In the future, NATO will need to consider issues of caveats at an early stage to help determine whether to become engaged or to act with a coalition of the willing and able. Related problems include inadequate supplies of some types of combat equipment, the relatively short tours for deployed forces from many NATO countries—a problem that is particularly acute in the case of PRTs—and the frequent turnover of the NATO-ISAF command team in Kabul, which handicaps conservation of experience.

Compensating with Nonmilitary Activity. In addition to military operations, these issues also affect political relations within the Alliance, with its cardinal principle of risk sharing. If the imposition of caveats regarding military activity is unavoidable for domestic political reasons, member states can compensate in part by heightened contributions to nonmilitary activities, including assistance with reconstruction, development, and governance. For example, in Afghanistan, poppy eradication, police training, and the creation of a functioning judiciary are all areas where European-led efforts have fallen short and where increased levels of support are needed. NATO should also continue to develop its concept of training missions—e.g., the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. It contributes to coalition military operations and demonstrates some burden sharing within the Alliance.

Contending Cultures. In recent years, day-to-day interaction between NATO’s political and military elements has increased because the Alliance has been engaged in both combat and postcombat peacekeeping. This has revealed communication problems and lack of understanding, especially between the civilian (i.e., diplomatic) and military cultures. These problems can be mitigated in part by leadership and greater efforts on the part of individuals to achieve mutual comprehension without abandoning key political principles (such as the consensus rule that binds allies politically). Even so, NATO urgently needs to reform the way it does business, especially in information and decision flow. NATO’s dependence on the flow of paper would not be tolerated by any modern corporation. The hardware and software to achieve a revolution in communications and electronic management have been developed and tested by Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Adopting a NATO Strategic Overview and making it available widely
throughout the Alliance could help bridge cultural and procedural divisions and enable the North Atlantic Council to make decisions on a timelier basis without sacrificing any necessary thorough review.

**Force and Effectiveness Enablers.** To get maximum effect from well-trained and equipped NATO forces, the allies should, to the extent possible, deploy the NATO Response Force in Afghanistan and in similar circumstances in the future. NATO should reform its practice of allowing costs to “lie where they fall”—i.e., requiring the countries providing forces for missions to bear all the costs rather than spreading them equitably across all allies. NATO needs to increase resources to ensure effective staffing, especially in the commands; the trend is now the opposite.

**The Comprehensive Approach.** The NATO Alliance has formally embraced the so-called comprehensive approach, which recognizes the need to relate different instruments and techniques to one another. Decisions taken at the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, need to be embraced throughout the Alliance, with major funding and committed civilian and military leadership.

**Working Beyond NATO.** Creating working relationships with other nonmilitary government agencies, international institutions, and NGOs is critical for NATO commanders in the field. In Afghanistan, the NATO ISAF commander must be able to coordinate activities of a wide variety of other actors, few of which are under his direct authority. His personal interaction and leadership skills are critical in bringing different instruments of power and influence into productive correspondence. Equally important is the deployment of high quality personnel from other countries and institutions. The NATO ISAF commander should be supported by a senior representative of the NATO Secretary General (a position that should be filled at a high level) in order to imbue him with sufficient authority, build trust within the organization, and ensure a clear link to NATO civilian leadership.

**Allied Command Transformation**

A major instrument for engaging allied and other non-U.S. capacities in the cooperation/coordination/integration of instruments of power and influence is NATO’s ACT, which is charged with being NATO’s leading agent of change. This includes the critical area of interoperability, which also incorporates information and knowledge sharing across the force.

**Training.** ACT is now (2008) assuming responsibility for training deployed/deployable NATO personnel and the Afghan National Army. This practice should be extended to all NATO training in Iraq and increased in size and scope.

**PRTs.** ACT should have senior responsibility for developing doctrine and requirements for PRTs, including training of potential PRT team members, both military and civilian, from different allied countries and the passing on of lessons learned and best practices.

**Add Civilians and Share Experience.** ACT should add a significant civilian component to develop doctrine, procedures, and techniques of civil-military cooperation within the theater, as well as to conduct both generic planning and training of NATO and national personnel. The results should be offered both to deployed and deployable NATO commands, to allied nations, and to the EU, along with lessons learned and best practices developed by ACT’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto, Portugal.
European Union

An increasing European role in circumstances focused on in this report is clearly valuable. It also adds to coherence and effectiveness of the EU, a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy for more than a half-century. The EU’s *European Security Strategy* of December 2003 identified five central challenges that are similar to those of greatest U.S. concern: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.

**Respective Military Roles.** Military roles to be played by EU institutions parallel those played by NATO, except for collective defense under NATO’s Article 5, where all agree that NATO would have responsibility. The theology of competition has been substantially muted on both sides, thus reducing differences that have often kept NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy acting at arms-length. *Still, significant barriers remain to full cooperation between NATO and the EU*, both in Brussels and in the field (especially in Afghanistan), the latter largely because of Turkish objections related to Cyprus and Ankara’s quest for EU membership.

**Beyond Military Roles.** The EU is ideally suited for assuming other security roles, including paramilitary deployments and police training. The EU also can provide significant capabilities, resources, and personnel, directly and through member states and NGOs, to fulfill nonmilitary (civilian) tasks. The EU should assume a much greater share of the collective non-military burden in Afghanistan, both through the appointment of a senior representative of substantial skills and stature and through the dedication of sizeable resources, far beyond the total contribution of European states so far. It should assume a major share of responsibility for the effective operation of PRTs in Afghanistan.

**Practical Cooperation.** NATO and the EU should jointly conduct training and exercises. They should cooperate on standardization and interoperability, as well as on a government-private partnership to reduce transatlantic barriers to defense trade, especially in high technology. The EU should have representatives in NATO planning (and vice versa), as well as in relevant planning agencies within the U.S. government, on both an immediate and contingency basis. The EU should also agree to so-called reverse Berlin-plus sharing of nonmilitary assets with NATO.

Building Beyond Conflict Situations

Finally, it has become apparent that the many lessons learned and best practices presented here can also have utility for a far broader range of U.S. engagements abroad during both military and nonmilitary activities. An important, immediate test case is the creation of the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), which, even more than the U.S. Southern Command for Latin America, will endeavor from the outset to blend and integrate different instruments of power and influence, with the emphasis on “influence” (and especially civilian influence). The lessons learned and best practices discussed here can be instrumental in helping AFRICOM to start out on the right foot and avoid being viewed primarily as a military instrument in a part of the world where such a perception is unlikely to serve overall U.S. goals.

The lessons learned and best practices discussed here can also have utility in shaping the roles of key international institutions like NATO, the EU, and the UN across a wide spectrum of military and civilian activities, especially regarding those tasks they can better undertake by working together rather than separately. However, outlining this application of our findings
in full measure is beyond the scope of this initial report. It should be the subject of follow-on work.