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Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence

Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence Report

A publication produced by the American Academy of Diplomacy and the RAND Corporation
Friday, October 3, 2008

As the U.S. prepares itself for emerging threats and future military interventions, how should it learn from past experiences to make its military operations more effective? The American Academy of Diplomacy and the RAND Corporation have published a new study detailing a set of practical national security recommendations for the incoming administration, the new Congress, and NATO to provide guidance on how to deal with future military operations and their aftermath. The report draws from the expertise of 67 U.S. and European senior practitioners from both civilian and military posts. The recommendations in the report are based on lessons learned from experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

The report recommends that the U.S. shift more resources to the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, and that military and civilian efforts be integrated from top to bottom. It also suggests that spending authority should be delegated to the field level and that civilians and military officers gain extensive experience between agencies and in one another’s disciplines.

Some of the Report’s key conclusions include:

  • The United States’ success in counterinsurgencies and counterterrorism requires more direct coordination and integration of military and non-military efforts, activities, agencies, and personnel than ever before. Arms-length relationships between key departments like the Defense Department and State Department are no longer acceptable;

  • A major increase is needed in U.S. resources for non-military activities — where the ratio between military and non-military national security spending is now 17 to 1. This should include adding at least 6,600 Foreign Service Officers for the State Department, 2000 for USAID, and recreating a separate “United States Information Agency-like” agency;

  • Building success must begin with career-wide training and education in modern techniques of military and non-military activities. There needs to be a reorganization of the civilian agencies to promote cross-agency, career-enhancing experience for military and non-military personnel, similar to the practice adopted by the military services under the Goldwater-Nichols Act passed in 1986;

  • Training in foreign cultures, history, and languages must be radically enhanced for both military and civilian personnel. Tours in conflict zones need to be extended for key personnel engaged in day-to-day relations with local officials and populations. The military needs to enhance long-term relationships with local counterparts;

  • Both long-term and short-term planning for interventions must be systematic and centered at the National Security Council level; planning must involve all relevant U.S. government agencies, plus the private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs);

  • As much military-civilian coordination as possible must be delegated to the operational level. This must include authority for U.S. ambassadors and military commanders to move money flexibly across tasks and agencies;

  • Responsibility for tasks should be assigned to those U.S. agencies and personnel — military or civilian — best able to carry them out. U.S. personnel in the field must stop “stove-piping” to their separate agencies in Washington. Departments like Agriculture, Justice, HHS, and Education must deploy personnel to the field;

  • Personnel deployed by the United States must build international partnerships with NATO, the European Union and the UN. Barriers to cooperation between NATO and the EU also must be broken down. Allied command transformation should be given a broad mandate to help make this happen;

  • Presidential leadership is key; Congress must also play its part, including the delegation of more flexible funding authority to the field. The Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office need to provide integrated “national security budgets” to guide policymakers. Congress needs a joint “national security committee” to advise on integrated policies.

Ambassador Robert Hunter co-chaired this report along with Ambassador Edward Gnehm, former U.S. ambassador to Jordon, and Gen. George Joulwan, former supreme allied commander Europe and commander-in-chief, U.S. Southern Command.

>Read Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence, full report [PDF]
>Read the Summary_2008 [PDF]

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